Angles for the Closing of the Kaesong Complex

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/asia/life-in-north-korean-complex-a-glimmer-of-hope.html?pagewanted=2&ref=asia

 

After reading this article, and observing its contents paired with those of the article which served as the base of last week’s post, one could draw the conclusion that the Kaesong factory complex was shut down because of a more complex situation then straining North-South-West relations. Perhaps the joint manufacturing program was abruptly cut short not only as a reaction to sanctions, but also as a last-ditch effort to keep the North Korean people from embracing the South’s capitalist economy and subsequently sharing of the lifestyle. Possibly, if Southern media and ideas are already leaking into the North from its, necessarily, less secure border with China, the North’s government’s reputation as held by its people has begun, ever so slightly, to fade. People in North Korea are beginning to see what free market economies can create, and the sort relative luxury, at the very least a steady supply of food, which could be obtained.

To support this theory, I would note that this article points out how South Korean managers entering the factory complex were searched for such items as newspapers, and that factory manuals were censored to block the mention of capitalism and “other banned ideas”. Other practices, which seem disturbing or completely unjust to those in the west, included transferring workers who make too good of friends to a South Korean manager, and meetings where a worker would be made to explain how he engaged in, to the eyes of the North, poor behavior to his peers. The article also points out how working in the factory complex would often bring about a wealthier style of living for the North Korean workforce. A prevalent example would be in the food choices of the North Korean workers. When the complex first opened, many workers ate a dish made from corn meal. Before the evacuation and closing of the complex, many workers were eating white rice, more expensive than corn, and occasionally had fish. While the food may not seem like much, some workers had obtained cell phones, not at all a common item.

Perhaps the closing of the Kaesong factory complex was a desperate bid at maintaining the North Korean government’s power for a bit longer, either by obtaining aid in exchange for a re-opening of the complex, or, failing that option, to move the people away from any political or material influence from the South.

Inside and Outside the North

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/27/opinion/global/The-Market-Shall-Set-North-Korea-Free.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=northkorea&

This article, The Market Shall Set North Korea Free, is given much credit from the identity of its author, Jang Jin-Sung, a former officer of psychological warfare in North Korea. Jang begins with by telling of his days as a psychological warfare officer. In this job, Jang had access to foreign media not available to the public, though sections directly relating to North Korea or the Korean War were heavily censored. Jang would secretly read the censored words through the ink, and learned of alternate perspectives on the North’s leadership and politics. Jang says that after he escaped the country, he realized that there were, metaphorically, three North Koreas. The first is the actual North Korea, that which its denizens witness every day. The second is the North Korea constructed by its government through propaganda. The third is the theoretical North Korea, a loosely constructed idea made by outside countries in an attempt to describe the secretive country. Though the South and the western powers attempt to converse with North Korea to soften their extreme policies, Jang claims that talking is useless and that talks with South Korea were referred to as “aid farming.”

However, Jang points out that the North’s government may be rotting from the bottom first. The government could not support the people, and the North Korean population relies on an “underground” economy to simply survive. Raw materials are bartered by workplaces, who are responsible for feeding their workers, to the Chinese for rice. When bartering is not done, trading is done using United States bank notes, and as the average person finds more faith in the dollar, they lose faith in the government’s promises. Along with psychological and economic independence, trading with the Chinese has allowed foreign media to enter the border. South Korean television is smuggled into the North via memory stick and DVD.

After reading this article, which I recommend if one were to have the slightest interest in the North Korean situation, I would conclude that the recent foolishness of the North is in fact a desperate bid to gain aid money from any source possible, to reinforce the rotting timbers upon which the authoritarian government is built. Any aid at this point would just draw out the internal economic collapse of the state.

Or Jang is, in essence, a double agent let loose by the North to provide us a logical explanation to  make the North Appear weak when it is not. Of course, this theory makes a terrible conjecture, and is perhaps even disrespectful to Jang. Especially considering that it would be a massive risk taken on a tactic of inverse psychology which would not result in aid making its way to the North.

Placate with Peace, Certainly not Cash

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/opinion/make-north-korea-an-offer.html

   In this note,  Robert Oppenheim, a Associate Professor of Asian Studies at the University of Austin, rebukes Jeremi Suri’s message to precisely strike North Korean’s missile launching pads and vehicles. Oppenheim claims that the US needs to extend a peace treaty to the North to officially end the Korean War.

   While a peace treaty would certainly be a nice gesture, Oppenheim doesn’t directly explain what benefits would come from such a treaty, though he seems to suggest that the treaty would placate the North by providing a sense of security.

   To me,  the theory seems mostly unreasonable yet a bit believable.  It makes sense that North Korea would be less hostile without the possibility of having a very one-sided war develop very quickly, but the idea tarnishes when it is taken into consideration that North Korea has had China, a major military and economic force, not to mention nuclear capable local superpower, as its mostly stalwart ally for some time.  The major factor contributing to China’s fluctuations in loyalty is the North’s increasing belligerency towards the South and its western allies, namely the United States.

   So if the North’s plan is to appear aggressive because they feel threatened, then their tactics are slowly losing them their biggest ally. For the third time, it seems that the best theory is probably that the North Korean’s plan is to extort aid from the west by negotiating a price for which they settle down for half a decade or so.

The North’s Relationship with China is Strained.

 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/world/asia/kim-jong-un-tests-relations-with-china.html?ref=world&_r=0

   Kim Jong Un’s December 2012 missile launch has strained Chinese-Korean relations heavily with the public of China, if not the government. According to Jane Perlez, from the New York Times, Li Jianguo and a small delegation notified Kim’s government that China’s leader did not wish for them to launch a ballistic missile. Obviously, Kim did not heed these words.

     Now North Korea’s antagonistic behavior, be it a true but ill-conceived intention of challenging the western powers, or a ploy to extract more foreign aid from countries such as the United States, has been questioned by official state newspapers in China, and directly jeered by the Chinese public on social media sites (it should be noted that internet websites are perhaps not the best forum for collecting information.)Common names used to describe Kim Jong Un on these social sites include “The Kid”(possibly alleging his youth and inexperience) and “Fatty the Third”. Even if the government has the North’s back, China’s people, evidently, do not.

     Recently, a prominent member of the Communist Party journal was suspened for writing an article in a British newspaper in which he suggested China abandon North Korea (http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/world/asia/chinese-suspend-editor-who-questioned-north-korea-alliance.html). While this article is a good note about China’s unrest with the North, it also displays the Chinese government’s disregard for dissent, perhaps the only reason China is still advocating a soft handling of North Korea.

     It would seem that North Korea is in a complex balancing act, attempting not to lose China’s trust while attempting to gain foreign aid from western countries, and not setting off hostile action in the process. Or Mr.Kim is trying to prove himself capable to the military to avoid a coup, regardless of consequence. Or maybe Kim is just making decisions irrationally.

    The theory that North Korea’s plan is too muscle aid from the United States and other western powers seems to be the most likely. Following that logic, the best response on the part of the US would be to ignore North Korea’s escalations. But Jeremi Suri, a proffesor of history and public affairs at the University of Texas, Austin, says that advanced notification should be given to the countries in the region, and a precision airstrike carried out on missile launch sites.(http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/opinion/bomb-north-korea-before-its-too-late.html) One should not be too hasty to dismiss the scenario as a outright ridiculous idea. The entire scenario depends on the response of the North Korean government and military to an airstrike. Obviously the response would not be a missile strike. If the North were to declare open war, and they did not have the backing of China, a well-conducted, traditional campaign would not last long. This assumption would suggest that North would not risk open war. However, the North Korean military is trained in a guerrilla style, and would most likely resort to such warfare as a method of dragging out the asymmetrical war. North Korea may not be as adverse to a war as Suri suggests, and a drawn-out campaign in Asia, on top of the mere presence of a military campaign, would be a major error if the first blow was carried by a US bomber. The best course of action at the time is to wait for North Korea to cool off after realizing their belligerency will not help them obtain aide. Unless it does.

Also, a bit of context on the tagline:

http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/hungry-kim-jong-un

US Reacts “Proportionally” to North Korea

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/world/asia/us-and-south-korea-devise-plan-to-counter-north.html?pagewanted=1&ref=world

This article by David E. Sanger and Thomas Shanker notes some less illuminated points of the current Korean tensions. A significant point they make is how North Korea continues it’s aggressive behavior, in part, because of a lack of response on the part of the United States.

As Sanger and Shanker note, the United States has been claiming for some time that it would not tolerate a nuclear North Korea, yet has not made any drastic action against their nuclear program. This is subject to change in the near future, though, as US and South Korean militaries increase activity in the region.

Sanger and Shanker also mention that China, the main advocate of non-aggressiveness toward the North, may become inclined to pressure North Korea into a peaceful state to reduce western military presence in Asia.

The article notes a few theorists, such as David Maxwell, the associate director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University, believe that swift and equal retaliation for any incidents caused by the North Korean government should be carried out. Perhaps a good description of the policy can be found in the old saying, “eye for an eye.”

The theory behind this policy seems sound. After all, what we’ve seen to this date is simply threats traded back and forth, propaganda, bold acts of defiance, and mustache curling by North Korea and a significant increase in military readiness and local strength by South Korea, the US, and, most recently, Japan. Perhaps a slap on the wrist is needed to calm the North. Failing to directly calm the North doesn’t necessarily hurt, either. As North Korea grows bolder, China grows more wary of its neighbor.